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INTRODUCTION 
The election of Donald Trump in late 2016 to the presidency of the US has placed populism at the 
forefront of debates about the future direction of international affairs. Europe, Latin America, the 
Middle East and Asia were already engulfed in populist politics for decades. There is the growing 
recognition that populism today is not exclusively a phenomenon of domestic politics, but that it 
influences significantly outcomes of world politics as well. It thus becomes important to understand 
better what the rise of populism means for foreign policy. This is a challenging endeavour, given how 
(relatively) little attention FPA has paid to populism specifically, and party politics more generally. 
The challenge is even bigger if one considers the slippery nature of the concept of populism, both 
in academic debates and public discourse. Analytical work on populism draws on many different 
theoretical traditions. The populist phenomenon also exhibits increasing empirical heterogeneity, 
appearing in multiple iterations in varying geographical and developmental contexts. Scholars of 
foreign policy and international relations who want to study the effect of populism have to deal with 
a varied, and sometimes convoluted, conceptual and empirical field. 
I argue that scholars of foreign policy would be well served to embrace the vibrancy of conceptual 
debates on populism. Different conceptualizations of populism have different implications about the 
role of populism in a political system and, by extension, the ways it affects foreign policy outcomes. I 
will also argue that comparative analysis of populist foreign policy can benefit from a broader 
geographical and regional scope of research. While the slippery nature of the concept of populism can 
often appear frustrating, its variegated nature also means that it can apply to, and increase our 
understanding of, varying phenomena of world politics and foreign policy.  
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CONCEPTUALIZING POPULISM 
a) Main Theoretical Approaches 
It is generally accepted that, in its core, populism promotes the juxtaposition in society of two 
homogeneous blocs – the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ – whereby one (the people) is seen as inherently 
virtuous. Thus populism is both Manichean and moralistic in its philosophy, as it carries an instinctive 
distrust of elites (Canovan 1999; Taggart 2000). Beyond this core of basic premises however populism 
is a concept that has been studied from a variety of theoretical approaches over time.  
Sociological approaches, of liberal or Marxist ilk, were prominent in the early years of research on 
populism. These approaches viewed populism as the outcome of and reaction to processes of 
modernization. Liberal approaches saw populism as an irrational reaction containing chauvinism, 
closed-mindedness and irresponsibility (Hofstadter 1955; Shils 1956). This view of populism dovetailed 
with the then mainstream view that modernization in peripheral economies was an inherently positive 
prospect. Thus early comparative work on populism concerned itself with developing countries in the 
process of modernization problematique (Ionescu and Gellner 1969). 
As modernization theories came under increased scrutiny and populism started appearing also in 
developed countries, new and more streamlined approaches for the comparative study of populism 
emerged. Taggart (2000) defined populism as an ‘empty shell’ filled by thicker ideologies according to 
which the virtuous people and the corrupt elites are defined. Mudde (2004; 2007) standardized this 
view for use in comparative work by conceptualizing populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’. Thicker 
and more consistent ideological frameworks of the right or left (e.g. socialism, liberalism or nativism) 
give populism its specific ideological outlook.  
Work on populism in Europe has overwhelmingly focused on the populist radical right. The 
populist radical right is a distinct political family that combines nativism, authoritarianism and 
populism (Albertazzi and McDonnel 2008, Mudde 2007). Populism allowed far right parties to update 
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discredited ideological features, such as racism and anti-democratic authoritarianism, by radicalizing 
elements of modernity like democratic representation and proliferation of social identities in 
increasingly diversified societies (Minkenberg 2000). The rise of the populist radical right is associated 
with the emergence of modernization or globalization losers (see Betz 1993 and Kriesi et al 2008 
respectively), i.e. strata dislocated by social differentiation and individualization, and 
deterritorialization of economic and political processes. Immigration has been the touchstone of the 
rise of the populist radical right because it symbolizes the porousness of borders and pressures on 
national economies and cultures (Kriesi et al 2008). 
Analogously to the far right, the post-communist far left has also tried to associate its core tenets 
– social justice, economic statism – with a discourse of popular emancipation against neoliberal elites. 
While the populist radical right defines the ‘people’ in cultural and ethnic terms, the populist left 
defines the ‘people’ in socioeconomic terms. It is therefore more inclusive than the populist radical 
right, since the latter targets opponents not only ‘above’ (the elites) but also ‘below’ the virtuous 
people (immigrants). Until the Great Recession of the 2000s however the populist left only enjoyed 
periodic successes in some countries and was generally less prominent than the populist radical right 
(March 2007; March and Mudde 2005).  
This comparative approach has become the main reference point in the study of parties and 
movements in the electoral arena, especially in Europe. But the empirical variety and geographical 
reach of populism means that other theoretical frameworks have also been used to examine 
prominent cases of populism. The case of Latin America, the region with the longest and strongest 
tradition of populism, has long been the object of theoretically informed analysis (see indicatively 
Roberts 2007, Weyland 2001), and only recently has there been an effort to analyse populism in Latin 
America using the thin-centred ideology approach (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). 
Populism in the United States is also difficult to classify comparatively. American populism was 
long associated with emancipatory, progressive and reformist politics (Nugent 1963). In the 1950s 
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however scholars highlighted the anti-intellectual, irrational and conspiratorial features of populist 
movements (Hofstadter 1955). At the root of this divide is American populism’s development largely 
free of explicit associations with thicker ideological traditions. Thus one may associate the populist 
farmers of the 1890s with ‘agrarianism’, or see populism as an expression of the ‘Jacksonian’ political 
tradition (Mead 2011). But even when one identifies elements that can be conventionally described 
as ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ these usually co-exist in the same populist movement (Kazin 2016). More 
generally, in the US populism appears to transcend formal partisan boundaries.  
A residue of modernization theory analyses of populism has been the persistent view of populism 
as a problematic phenomenon (see discussion in Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017). A response to this 
tendency is the work of Ernesto Laclau and his associates (Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). Laclau viewed 
populism as an antagonistic logic and discourse of politics that aggregates multiple frustrated social 
demands around binary contests between a variously defined ‘people’ – a signifier that coalesces 
these frustrated demands – and the ‘power’ or ‘system’. The insinuation in Laclau’s work, as well as 
the interpretations of his followers in the so-called Essex School (Stavrakakis 2014), is that populism 
in its purest form is an inclusive and emancipating phenomenon that brings ‘the people’ back into play 
in political settings stifled by depoliticization and technocracy.  
While thicker ideological traditions remain important for the self-perception of European populist 
parties, recent developments in Europe seem to vindicate the insight of critical and discursive 
approaches such as Laclau’s that the key characteristic of populist politics is the creation of potent 
dividing lines between the ‘people’ (variously defined) and the ‘system’ – a divide Peter Mair some 
years back had conceptualized as reflecting the fundamental difference between mainstream 
technocratic parties of all ideological persuasions focused on ‘responsible’ government and anti-
system parties clamouring for more ‘representative’ government (Mair 2009).  
Comparative analysis of developments in Europe during the Great Recession (the emergence of 
parties difficult to place on the conventional spectrum of the left-right like the Five Star Movement, 
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or the creation of a governing coalition in Greece in 2015 between the radical left and nationalist right) 
has acknowledged, without shedding the framework of the thin-centred ideology, the need for ‘a 
more flexible and more broadly encompassing understanding’ of populism, including not just the 
ideological dimension but also a discursive style and a political strategy (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The 
point here is that policy positions of populist parties, including their foreign policy preferences, are 
not just derivative of the interaction between their thick ideological traditions and populism’s 
thinness, but perhaps also of core characteristics of the logic of populist politics per se. 
b) Populism in World Politics 
Assessing populists’ attitudes towards issues of world politics requires an understanding of what 
international conditions bring about populism. Various explanations have been offered on this. In 
mature developed economies populism has arisen over the last 30 years as a response to long-
standing tendencies of hollowing out of accountable and representative democratic rule (Mair 2013), 
of economic diversification and modernization (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al 2008; Rydgren 2013), and 
of social fragmentation and liberalization (Minkenberg 2000). In developing and emerging economies 
in the periphery and the semi-periphery on the other hand, populism represents a reaction to patterns 
of incorporation in the global economy that entail both socioeconomic hardship and a challenge to 
sovereignty and accountability of political rule (Aytaç and Öniş 2014; Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017). 
To varying degrees all these phenomena have been related to globalization as the overarching 
structural condition of global politics since the end of the Cold War (Rodrik 2011). 
Thus populism is something more than just reaction to hard economic times brought about by 
modernization. Michael Zürn’s work on legitimacy of global governance is particularly pertinent here 
(Zürn 2004; Zürn et al 2012). Zürn identifies populism as a reaction to the denationalization of political 
rule and the depoliticization of global governance. As ‘transgovernmental’ global governance 
institutions bring together officials, operatives and bureaucrats of national administrations regulating 
the flows of globalization, populism expresses for Zürn a reaction of national societies against the 
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collusion and escape of state apparatuses from popular control. Unlike transnational new politics 
movements that seek to re-politicize governance on the international level, populism represents 
politicization on the national level (Zürn 2004).  
Zürn’s conceptualization of populism as a reflection of the divide between state and society within 
a context of globalization evokes the insights of discursive approaches that see populism as a mode of 
antagonistic politics between the ‘people’ and ‘power’. It is not a coincidence that many analyses of 
populism in the Global South that view it as a reaction to a globalized capitalist economy do so through 
this discursive/critical approach (Hadiz 2016). It is also telling that developments in populist politics in 
Europe that have opened up space for analyses of populism as a discourse (rather than an ideology) 
have been the result of broader structural shifts on a regional scale (the Eurozone crisis and economic 
recession) (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).    
Thus the positioning of populism in an international framework also implies the broadening of the 
conceptual framing of populism as a phenomenon of world politics. For discursive and critical 
approaches the opposition between society and political power is the key feature of populism, thus it 
can also be given primacy in explaining preferences of populist movements in foreign policy. The 
mainstream comparative approach on the other hand traces foreign policies of populist parties to the 
interaction between the core tenets of populism and the thick ideological traditions they carry.  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOREIGN POLICY 
The question of populism in foreign policy is a subset of the question of the role of political parties 
in foreign policy. There are two broad strands of research on political parties in foreign policy, carrying 
their own sets of questions and implications for the role of populism in foreign policy: a strand that 
examines the effect of parties as carriers of specific ideological preferences on foreign policy, and a 
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strand that examines the role of parties as an institutional parameter of foreign policy making. Both 
viewpoints find their application in works on the populism in foreign policy. 
The first strand tries to explain partisan foreign policy preferences with reference to preferences 
on domestic governance. In this vein, Rathbun (2004) saw political parties’ preferences in foreign 
policy as a direct reflection of their ideology. Depending on whether they are ‘rightist’ or ‘leftist’, 
political parties pursue exclusive interest-driven or inclusive values-driven foreign policies. Kaarbo 
(2012) has argued that right-wing coalitions tend to be more conflict-prone than left-wing ones. 
Thérien and Noël (2000) and Carbone (2007) see political parties playing an important role in 
development aid (with centre-left parties being more generous than centre-right ones), while Noël 
and Thérien (2008) argue that the agenda of international institutions in global economic governance 
reflects the fluctuating influence of ideologies of the left and right. Moving beyond the left-right 
divide, Ozkececi-Taner (2005) sees partisan positions on Turkish foreign policy as extension of specific 
political identities of domestic politics (e.g. nationalism, Islamism etc.), while Hofmann (2013) claims 
that the emergence of ESDP/CSDP in the 1990s can be traced back to policy ideas developed as parts 
of broader sets of partisan policy preferences.  
In sum this approach sees partisan foreign policy positions as reflecting ‘visions of domestic 
society’ (Manow et al 2008). This has been a staple of literature about partisan positions on European 
integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). Of course in Europe EU integration has domesticated many 
policy areas, thus turning them from a matter of intergovernmental bargaining to one of ideological 
contestation. Yet deterritorialization of domestic policy and domestication of external policies affects 
all polities in the world. Whether affected by Europeanization or globalization, national foreign policies 
are becoming increasingly subject to domestic scrutiny and contestation akin to domestic policy issues 
(Verbeek and Van der Vleuten 2008). The importance of party politics for foreign policy increases 
accordingly. 
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A parameter that affects how parties express their ideological preferences is the systemic 
character of party competition. Thus Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) take into account the dynamics of 
party competition in Italy to explain the varying capacity of the Lega Nord to inform the foreign policies 
of Italian governments it was a member of, while Chryssogelos (2015a) shows how the polarization of 
party competition in Greece crucially conditioned the content, pace and timing of important changes 
in its foreign policy towards Turkey.  
Τhe second strand of research in partisan foreign policy examines what kind of institutional 
settings allows parties to exert influence over foreign policy. Kaarbo’s work on coalitions and foreign 
policy is indicative of this approach (Kaarbo 1996; 2008; 2012; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). It is argued 
there that coalition governments tend to adopt more extreme foreign policy positions. Also, junior 
coalition partners can influence a government’s foreign policy if they occupy relevant cabinet posts or 
if they can employ a credible threat to bring down a government. Elsewhere, Oppermann and 
Brummer (2014) compare the capacities and pathways for junior partners to influence coalition 
foreign policies in conservative-liberal cabinets in Germany and the UK.  
 
POPULISM AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE STATE OF THE ART 
Perhaps the first comprehensive comparative analysis on the foreign policy of populist parties is 
a volume on the foreign and security policy positions of the populist far right in Europe (Liang 2007). 
The findings point to a common policy profile of the populist far right in foreign policy, focused on 
Euroscepticism, anti-Americanism, fear of Muslim immigration and Islam more generally, opposition 
to Turkey’s entry into the EU, and new security threats like terrorism. The populist right is interestingly 
not rejectionist of the role of Europe in foreign and security affairs. Rather, the populists of the right 
seem to have, next to a nationalist view, also a cultural perception of international affairs, hoping that 
Europeans will close ranks against multiculturalism at home and alien threats from abroad. As a 
reflection of their ethnopluralism – the notion that different ethnic groups and cultures must remain 
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apart – Liang’s volume sees right-wing populist parties promoting internationally a vision of globalized 
nationalism whereby distinct national groups join forces to oppose the homogenizing economic and 
cultural impact of globalization.  
Populist foreign policy in Europe was also the focus of the work of Chryssogelos (2010; 2011). He 
identified a common populist profile in foreign policy spanning the right and left in the areas of 
transatlantic relations, Russia, and global governance (international institutions, aid, migration etc.). 
His findings were broadly aligned with those of Liang, as populists are united by a common negative 
attitude towards the US and globalization, a sceptic stance towards processes of global governance 
and military engagements outside of Europe, and a positive view of Russia’s role in European security. 
The justifications for these policies however differed substantially between the populist right and left 
in reflection of their prior ideological rooting. Balfour (2016) also reaches similar conclusions, 
emphasizing particularly the unpredictability and contingency of populist positions on foreign policy 
in Europe.  
The security crises in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2013-14 severely burdened EU-Russia 
relations and produced an intense interest in the ties between Russia and the European far right. Of 
interest here is both the political and personal ties between Russian actors close to the Kremlin and 
various actors of the far right in Europe, as well as the policy positions and the political support 
provided by populist parties to Russian actions (Balfour 2016; Political Capital 2014). While the focus 
with regards to Russia has been overwhelmingly on the populist right, the relations of the European 
populist left with Russia also recently gained attention due to the overtures of the Syriza-led Greek 
government during its renegotiation of its bailout agreement with the Eurozone1.  
Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) examine the role of the Lega Nord in Italian foreign policy as a junior 
partner in various coalition governments between 1994 and 2011. Like Liang, they see LN’s foreign 
policy as stemming from its ideological profile, including its opposition to immigration and its 
                                                          
1 H Smith and A Luhn, ‘Alexis Tsipras flies to Moscow amid speculation of bailout from Putin’. The Guardian, 8 April 2015. 
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scepticism towards the role of the US in world affairs. Yet these predispositions can cue conflicting 
preferences – e.g. the LN is Eurosceptic but at the same time expected the EU to help Italy deal with 
rising waves of migrants arriving to its shores. The LN’s voter profile also played a role in its policy 
changes: the small manufacturers and family businesses that initially supported LN were positive 
towards the European market, but in recent years have turned much more fearful of globalization (see 
also Woods 2009).  
Foreign policy inconsistency and change has been a common phenomenon in the foreign policy 
of European populists. During the Cold War the Front National was pro-NATO and anti-Soviet (Shields 
2007). In the 1990s its relationship with Russia mostly had to do with contacts with likeminded 
nationalists. It only discovered Russia as a point of reference after relations between Moscow and the 
West soured in the late-00s. Similarly, a key feature of FPÖ’s populism in Austria during the 1980s and 
1990s was its support for Austria’s entry into NATO, a position against Austria’s well-established 
neutral identity (Meyer 2007). But from the early-00s onwards the FPÖ started shifting its foreign 
policy, opposing American interventionism and developing strongly pro-Russian positions. These 
changes have been usually attributed to populism’s thinness and populist leaders’ fickleness, but a 
closer examination of the French and Austrian cases shows that changes in the foreign policy positions 
of populist parties reflect conscious strategic decisions of these parties to reposition themselves in 
their countries’ party competition (Chryssogelos 2015b). 
There has been a long-standing debate about the relationship between populism and foreign 
policy in the US, which has intensified in recent years in response to the rise of the Tea Party and the 
election of Donald Trump to the presidency. Most typically populism, in its 1890s agrarian variant and 
in its 20th century incarnations, has been associated with economic protectionism (Krugman 1993) and 
political isolationism (Kazin 2016). Yet this would be an incomplete picture. In a highly interesting 
analysis of how the Populist Party saw foreign policy issues of the day (the war with Spain in 1898, the 
Boer War, and the great Indian famine), Amstutz shows agrarian populists as being highly interested 
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in world affairs and mobilized on the side of ‘republican government’ and anti-imperialism, thus 
projecting abroad their ideas about popular sovereignty at home (Amstutz 2014).  
Mead (2011) also offers a more sophisticated picture of American populism, which dislikes 
international institutions and needless sacrifices of US resources, but also believes in full-on military 
engagement if core American interests and security are threatened. In discussing the Tea Party, Mead 
claims that only a minority wing is principally isolationist, while its majority may reject the 
identification of US interests with the global institutional order but still understands the necessity of 
international engagement. This analysis seems to capture also the main themes of Donald Trump’s 
2016 presidential campaign, where he simultaneously advocated trade protectionism, dismissal of 
costly alliances and security guarantees, and an aggressive militaristic response to Islamic jihadism.  
Analyses about populism and foreign policy in non-Western countries are rare. An interesting 
exception is Dodson and Dorraj (2008) who compare the foreign policies of Venezuela and Iran under 
two populist leaders: Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These populist leaders were united 
by anti-imperialism and the fear that the US intended to destabilize the domestic order they were 
defending – the Bolivarian socialist revolution in Venezuela and the theocratic Islamic regime in Iran. 
As a result, they saw foreign policy as an instrument to stave off US efforts to undermine their 
domestic regimes. They did so by making use of the advantages conferred by their oil resources (on 
‘resource populism’ see also Tsafos 2007) and engaging in regional alliance-making and institution 
building. Dodson and Dorraj stress the importance of Americanismo – the ideology of Latin American 
unity forged through a shared experience of European colonialism and exploitation by the US – for 
Chavist populism (see here also Ellis, 2014 and Hawkins, 2016), while Ahmadinejad’s regional foreign 
policy in the Middle East bolstered Iran’s image as an anti-imperialist force among developing states 
and the Muslim world.  
This review shows that the literature on populism in foreign policy is still relatively small but 
rapidly growing. Building (implicitly or explicitly) on the main insights of the literature on political 
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parties and foreign policy, most of these analyses embark from the view that partisan foreign policies 
are extrapolations of preferences on domestic policy issues. Populist radical right parties in Europe for 
example oppose international developments that they see as threatening their idealized vision of the 
political community, e.g. increase of immigration or the deepening of European integration that 
threatens national sovereignty. The same mechanism is at play with the foreign policy of populist left 
parties, whose anti-Americanism and scepticism towards the institutions of global governance reflects 
their opposition to neoliberal economics at home.  
Existing research on populism in foreign policy also draws on FPA considerations about the role of 
political parties in coalition politics, examining the role of populist parties in coalition foreign policy. 
This is facilitated by the fact that in Europe, where most of this research focuses on, populist parties 
have found themselves in office primarily in coalition with mainstream parties (starting in the early 
2000s, this has been the case in Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands) 
(Heinisch 2003). There may be a need for a shift in focus however as populist parties are entrenching 
themselves in European party systems and are forming single-party governments (e.g. Poland) or 
dominate coalition governments (e.g. Greece). 
Also most of the literature on populism in foreign policy prioritizes the dominant comparative 
approach that views populism as a thin-centred ideology that is given a precise content by its 
association with thicker ideological traditions (see Verbeek and Zaslove forthcoming). This approach 
helps detect similarities and differences within party families (e.g. the populist radical right), as well 
as between them (e.g. the populist right and the populist left). By updating and revamping older 
authoritarian ideologies and traditions of European politics, populism allows the far right and the far 
left’s positions on migration, security, globalization and capitalism to find a place in contemporary 
public discourse (Chryssogelos 2011).  
 
EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES, CONCEPTUAL RESPONSES 
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Despite the important new ground these works have broken, the global proliferation of populism 
and its increased relevance in academic and public debates on international affairs (Foreign Affairs 
2016) call for some reappraisal of established approaches in the study of populism in foreign policy. It 
is unclear for example how well the ‘thin-centred ideology’ approach accommodates newly emergent 
and increasingly varied populisms. Of course one can still identify thicker ideologies that inform 
populist movements in other regions, such as Americanismo (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011) or 
Islamism (Hadiz 2016).  
But perhaps it is not always helpful to relegate the core ideological elements of populism (however 
thin) to the background. This is particularly true not only of the Global South (where traditions of thick 
ideologies such as liberalism or socialism are weaker), but even of Europe. The success of populist 
parties like SYRIZA in the Eurozone crisis has after all been convincingly interpreted on the basis of 
their capacity to make broader interpellations along a people-elite cleavage that transcends prior 
ideological divides (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). 
In the US on the other hand populism is seen both as the ideology of a specific political party – the 
Populists of the 1890s – and as a diffuse political culture that postulates a popular challenge against 
elites and that may take different forms and orientations (nativist-exclusivist or economic-reformist).  
In non-Western countries, it is unclear what other ideology such leaders as e.g. Thaksin Shinawatra in 
Thailand (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008) or Michael Sata in Zambia (Fraser 2017) represented apart 
from a distinct antagonistic appeal for mobilization on the basis of a division between ‘the people’ and 
‘power’. The point here is that scholars of foreign policy can focus not simply on how populism helps 
promote prior thicker ideological traditions, but on whether foreign policy positions are themselves 
the function of traits of populist ideology tout court.  
One can for example interpret populist foreign policies on the basis of how opposition to elites at 
home is underpinned by opposition to elites internationally. Opposition to elites at home and abroad 
can explain the anti-American turn of populist parties in Europe after the end of the Cold War, since 
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the US became the undisputed superpower and populists could associate it with a variety of policies 
they opposed – free trade, loss of sovereignty, cultural homogenization etc. Some parties of the 
populist radical right in Europe have rebranded the historical anti-Semitism of the European far right 
when commenting on the Israel-Palestine conflict as support for Palestinians as the underdogs against 
an oppressor (Israel). Other times, and depending on whether they have wanted to present Islam as 
the biggest threat to the ‘people’, they have also presented Israel as the underdog in its fight with 
radical Islam (Chryssogelos 2011; Liang 2007). 
The emergence not just of populist movements but of populist governments in various parts of 
the world also presents new empirical puzzles. Trump is the latest and most prominent example of 
course, and Latin America has a long experience with populists in power. Already some scholars have 
engaged in cross-regional comparisons not simply of populist movements but of populists in power 
(Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). But over the last 15 years many world leaders have attracted the 
characterization of ‘populist’ as they try to justify their own entrenchment in power by using foreign 
policy to polarize against the West (Dodson and Dorraj 2008, Robinson and Milne 2017).  
Depending on the local context or their rooting in thicker ideological traditions, populist parties’ 
understanding of the people to be protected and represented and the ‘heartland’ they look back to 
(Taggart 2000) will differ. Variation along this dimension may have important influence on foreign 
policy. Populist parties and movements are most commonly associated with reaction to institutions 
and processes on the international or transnational level that undercut political representation and 
accountability of national authorities.  
The Euroscepticism of the populist radical right is a case in point here, but the attitudes of the 
populist left that has emerged in the years of the Eurozone crisis are also of interest. In his first months 
in power Alexis Tsipras pursued a renegotiation of the terms of financing of the Greek debt that took 
little account of the preferences of Greece’s partners. In Spain, Pablo Iglesias of Podemos calls himself 
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(somewhat unexpectedly for a leftist) a soberanista (Gerbaudo 2016; see here especially 
Halikiopoulou et al 2012). 
But populist foreign policy positions may also be informed by conceptualizations of the people 
that transcend national borders. This is important for the foreign policy positions of populists. The US 
Populist Party’s conceptualization of the ‘people’ in the 1890s was broad enough to encompass 
struggles for sovereignty all over the world (Amstutz 2014). More recently, populists in the Global 
South have often defined the ‘people’ in ways that betray regional or global aspirations. The left-wing 
populisms of the 2000s in Latin America defined the people on the basis of Latin America and its 
experience of exploitation by Europe and the US (the ideology of Americanismo, see Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). This in turn informed foreign policy positions that were adversarial to the US 
and led to attempts to create new structures of regional cooperation in Latin America (Ellis 2014, 
Hawkins 2016). Mahmud Ahmadinejad aimed to speak for the Muslim world, the Middle East and the 
whole Global South against the US and the West (Dodson and Dorraj 2008). Recep Tayip Erdogan’s 
populism defines the people as the global Islamic umma (Hadiz 2016), which informs, along with 
Turkey’s Ottoman past, his regional and global ambitions for Turkish foreign policy. 
Foreign policy analysts interested in populism can also draw interesting insights by looking at 
broader areas of foreign policy beyond just political, diplomatic or security issues. Immigration has 
long been a marker issue for the European populist radical right, but economic matters, particularly 
trade, are also growing in importance (Verbeek and Zaslove forthcoming). The promise of both the 
Trump and the Brexit campaigns to ‘take back control’ in immigration and the voluntarism of the US 
and UK governments as they aggressively look for ‘good trade deals’2 are indicative of a mind-set that 
prioritizes immediate national interests to the detriment of international institutions and rules 
(Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). This in turn reflects populism’s well known anti-institutionalist bent, 
                                                          
2 Henry Austin, ‘Theresa May Looking Forward to Pursuing Trade Deal with Donald Trump.’ The Independent, 26 January 
2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-theresa-may-donald-trump-trade-deal-european-
union-eu-us-a7548511.html, accessed 2 April 2017. 
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prioritizing as it does the will of the people against institutionalized decision-making processes, 
consensus, checks and balances etc. (Meny and Surel 2002). 
It is important here then to differentiate between populism and isolationism in foreign policy. 
Populists do not necessarily promote a principled shielding off from the rest of the world. What they 
represent – both in the West and the Global South – is a reaction to processes of dilution of popular 
sovereignty (Amstutz 2014). Coming back to Zürn’s (2004) conceptualization, populism seeks to re-
politicize global affairs by promoting a direct relationship, unshackled by complex processes of rule-
making and governance practices, between the ‘people’ (nationally or transnationally defined) and 
international politics. In practical terms this means that populists will engage with the world, but only 
in terms that favour immediate national interests and do not entail sacrifices for the sake of broader 
milieu goals (Mead 2011). By the same token, populism need not equal trade protectionism (though 
this is very often the case); populists like free trade if it does not entail material sacrifices (Verbeek 
and Zaslove, forthcoming). 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Populism and foreign policy is an underexplored and relatively neglected sub-field in FPA. But this 
means that there are exciting opportunities for sophisticated and relevant research in the future, 
especially at the time when politicians, opinion-makers and the lay public are eagerly trying to discern 
patterns and implications of the global rise of populism for international politics. The contested and 
slippery nature of the concept of populism is both an obstacle and an advantage: it hampers the 
emergence of an unambiguous and clear conceptualization of populism, but it provides the leeway for 
eclectic theorizing that may accommodate varying iterations of populism in multiple world regions 
and help explain policy stances that sometimes seem inconsistent and fickle. 
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Thus one suggestion is for scholars of foreign policy to engage with the whole breadth of 
conceptual approaches of populism – ideological, discursive, critical etc. While the ‘thin-centred 
ideology’ approach has proven extremely useful in incorporating populism in comparative research of 
foreign policy in Europe, the increasing variability and global spread of the populist phenomenon call 
for a broadening of the conceptual horizon. Depending on their empirical focus and theoretical 
preferences, foreign policy analysts may also want to follow critical and discursive approaches that 
have been quite apt at relating populism to developments of global politics – particularly as a reaction 
to dislocations of globalization.  
The second point is for scholars to broaden not just their conceptual but also their empirical and 
geographical reach, and to think about populism as a factor of foreign policy in all world regions 
(Europe and Latin America, but also North America, Asia, Middle East and Africa). Most comparative 
work on populism in foreign policy focuses on Europe, where populists have rarely been in power 
(although this has changed in recent years) and are generally weaker than elsewhere (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). But some of the most significant populist leaders for foreign policy have 
emerged outside of Europe (Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, and now the US). The insights of the growing 
literature on cross-regional comparisons of populism will be very useful for FPA scholars here 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2008). 
Needless to say, the broadening of the conceptual and the empirical agenda does not imply two 
parallel and unrelated processes. It is interesting for example how much the immense literatures on 
populism in the US and populism in Europe have evolved with little reference to each other. But 
ongoing developments in the politics of both the US and Europe shows that populist phenomena on 
both sides of the Atlantic increasingly influence, and perhaps feed off, each other (e.g. the Trump and 
Brexit campaigns). It is important for scholars in the US and Europe to become more informed and 
articulate in the other’s experience with populism, thus informing and challenging their own 
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theoretical preconceptions of this phenomenon. This in turn may generate a fuller view of what 
populism means for world politics and foreign policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Populist parties, movements and leaders seem to emerge primarily under conditions of 
concurrent crises of economic performance and political representation (Hadiz and Chryssogelos 
2017). To the extent that this simultaneous political and economic crisis is conditioned by a state’s 
relative position towards overarching international conditions and shifts such as globalization (Rodrik 
2011), the positioning of populists towards the international sphere is more important than what 
appears initially. 
Of course one cannot speak of one populist foreign policy today. The ideological variability of 
populist parties and movements is too big, and their capacity to influence foreign policy also varies. 
Populist parties pursue foreign policies that reflect their domestic preferences and values, but these 
are mediated by institutional and party system structures (just like the foreign policy preferences of 
other parties). It is generally difficult to extrapolate foreign policy positions of likeminded ideological 
parties from their domestic preferences, when states are faced with diverse challenges that make 
comparability across time and between cases difficult.  
That said, one can still identify some basic principles of what constitutes a populist streak of 
foreign policy. Populists tend to view the world via the lens of the opposition between the people and 
the elites. They have a sense of sovereignty against global and transnational political and economic 
forces; their ‘people’ is usually defined along national lines (thus their foreign policy may also be 
described as ‘nationalist’) (Halikiopoulou et al 2012) but this is not always the case, particularly with 
populists from the Global South who may speak for broader constituencies (Latin America, the Muslim 
world etc.).  
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Populists tend to be anti-Western to the extent that the dominant political and institutional 
arrangements of post-Cold War international politics are identified with the West (Ellis 2014). 
Populists from the Global South will call for these institutions to be made more representative, while 
populists in the West will oppose the loss of national sovereignty and the political and economic costs 
the ‘people’ have to undergo to sustain this system. Populists are not isolationists in principle, but 
transpose to the international sphere their distrust for complex policymaking procedures. They 
politicize world politics the same way they radicalize domestic politics, prioritizing the will of the 
people against norms of efficiency, consensus and institutional checks and balances. 
The exact content of populist foreign policies will differ according to the thicker ideologies these 
parties and movements express. The view of populism as a thin-centred ideology predominates in 
comparative analyses of populism and has informed most work on the role of populism in foreign 
policy. While these works have created important advances in the study of populism in FPA, it is also 
worth analyzing populist foreign policy taking into account the independent effect of populism on the 
policy preferences of populist parties. Thus FPA scholars can also look into critical and discursive works 
as a way to enrich their understanding of populism, as well as broaden the empirical scope of their 
comparisons and analysis.  
Given the global proliferation of populism and the increasing realization among policymakers and 
the lay public that it is a very consequential phenomenon for international relations, this broadening 
of the theoretical and empirical agenda in the study of populism in foreign policy is today more 
necessary than ever.  
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